Abstract sn developing industries rms hve to deide whether nd when to enter the mrket depending on the stte of demndD existing rms in the industryD nd the rm9s pilitiesF his pper investigtes model of inresing demndD in whih rms deide when to enter the mrket ntiiE pting the strtegi ehvior of other potentil entrntsD nd the eets of entry on future potentil entrntsF he pper shows tht the ility of erly entry to deter future ompetitors9 entry leds rms to enter the mrket t rte fster thn demnd is expndingF sf there is the potentil for mny rms to enter the mrketD rms my e less likely to enter euse of future ompetitor entry to orret ny mrket opportunitiesF sf rms enter the mrket depending on their xed pilities rther thn depending on the rm9s irumstnes t eh moment in timeD rms end up entering the mrket t fster rte in the erly periodsF
1. Introduction sn growing industries potentil entrnts hve to deide whether nd when to enter the indusE tryF por exmpleD in the stellite rdio industry in the lte WH9sD wD iriusD nd other potentil ompetitors hd to deide when to enter the industryF I sf rm enters too erlyD the return on investment my ome too lte to reoup the entry ostsD ut the rm is gurnteed ple in the industryF sf the rm delys entryD the present vlue of the entry osts will e lowerD ut the rm my nlly prefer not to enter euse other rms entered erlierF his trdeEo yields n equilirium timing for the rm to enter the mrketF sn the stellite rdio industry seD oth w nd irius @nd only w nd iriusA deided to enterD ut eventully mergedF yne question tht rises is whether in equilirium rms enter the mrket t rte fster thn tht t whih the mrket expndsF his n result when rms enter the mrket erlier in order to deter entry from ompetitorsF e nd tht this will indeed ourD euse of the strtegi intertion mong potentil entrnts nd the eets from entry deterreneF e show tht this eet is stronger the greter the opportunity for rms to enter prior to the mrket expnsionF P es motivting exmpleD onsider the urrent se of the hyrid r tegoryF Q sn the FF this tegory9s rst min produt lunh ws the oyot rius in PHHHF ine then there hve een QP produt introdutions through the end of PHHV @httpX==enFwikipediForg=wiki=vist of hyrid rsAD with expettions or nnounements of RH dditionl produt lunhes in the following three yersF et the sme time the totl shre of hyrid rs is expeted to inrese from PFP7 of the FF mrket in PHHU to IH7 y PHISD nd to RH7 y PHQHD with out UH7 shre of eletriEdrive vehilesF R ht 1 See, for example, some information on the satellite radio industry in \XM Satellite Radio (A)," HBS case 9-504-009. 2 In the late 1990's E Ink entered aggressively into the electronic ink category partly in order to get demand and potentially deter other competitors' entry (\E Ink," HBS case 9-800-143).
3 Several important aspects of this example are not considered in the model below. However, the example illustrates a situation of a signicant number of product launches before the demand expansion, because not launching early would mean losing substantial market share to competitors and other potential entrants. 4 See \Moving to Electric-Drive," Hener, 2009 , http://www.sais-jhu.edu/bin/g/w/Hener.pdf, and other fore-P isD there is lrge numer of produt lunhesD nd nnouned produt lunhesD in dvne of the potentil expeted sles tkeEo in the tegoryF pirms enter the mrket in dvne of the sles tkeEoD s delying erly entry my men tht rm loses sustntil mrket shre to the ompetitorsD nd potentilly e deterred from entryF e lso investigte the eet of the numer of potentil entrntsD nd of privte informtion of entry osts on the strength of this entry deterrene eetF e rm9s deision to enter the mrketD in ddition to eing dependent on the stte of demnd nd the existing rms in the mrketD my depend on the rm9s onditions @eFgFD entry ostsA nd its eliefs s to wht the other rms might doD s wellF sf the rms9 onditions re stle through timeD nonEentry of potentil entrnt my prtilly revel tht tht potentil entrnt hs poor onditions for entering the mrketF his my potentilly led the remining potentil entrnts to dely entry s they fer too mny entries in the next periodF yn the other hndD if the rms9 onditions vry from period to period the overll @stohstiA hrteristis of the pool of potentil entrnts does not hnge through timeD nd the rms my hve n inentive to dely entry in the hope of ttining etter future entry onditionsF egrwl nd fyus @PHHPA show empirilly tht ross severl industries the tkeEo of the numer of rms ours efore the tkeEo of demndF yne explntion presented for this empiril result is tht supply retes demndF his pper shows tht this explntionD lthough potentilly importnt in some mrketsD is not essentil to explin the pttern in the dtF sn ftD this pper theoretilly explores rtionle for this empiril regulrity sed on rms eing forwrdElooking nd the entry deterrene eets of the existene of rms in the industryF hen @PHHVA investigtes empirilly this rtionle with dynmi struturl model of rm entry nd exit in the erly yers of the lothes wsher industryF S ulepper nd qrddy @IWWHA nd ulepper @IWWTA disuss severl empiril fts relted to the evolution of demnd nd the numer of rms in the developing phses casts in \Hybrid Market Forecasts," hybridcars.com, 2006. 5 Ericson and Pakes (1995) present a framework for empirical work with the possibility of rm entry and exit in an industry. Gallant et al. (2009) present an empirical model of dynamic entry with cross-product spill-overs. Q of new industriesD nd tovnovi @IWVPA presents model with perfet ompetition of the evolution of the numer of rms in new industryF T elted to tovnovi @IWVPA this pper onsiders the se of imperfet strtegi ompetition where the entry of one rm my deter other rms from enteringF ith imperfet ompetitionD there is lso literture foussing on the eets of stohsti entry nd exit due to rms9 mixed strtegies @eFgFD hixit nd hpiro IWVTD etts PHHHAF U sn reltion to tht litertureD this pper onsiders the eet of dynmi entry prior to demnd tkeEoD nd the eets of privte informtionF his pper n lso e seen s relted to the literture on preemption nd doption of new tehnology @eFgF qilert nd rrrisD IWVRD pudenerg nd iroleD IWVSA in whih rms hve to deide whether to dopt new tehnology with enets for the rst dopterF ht literture fouses on preemption nd rent equliztion eets while this pper looks t the dynmis of entry s it reltes to demnd evolutionF elso relted is the work on dynmi gr the dollr4 gmes @entry into nturl monopolyAD knowing tht entry is only protle if only one rm enters the mrketD nd leds to losses if oth rms enter the mrket @see pudenerg nd iroleD IWWSD ppF IPUEIPVAF sn reltion to tht literture this pper looks t the dynmi se where rms n deide to enter in dvne of mrket growthD nd explores how suh possiility ets the rte of mrket entryD nd the rms9 strtegi ehviorF elso relted to this pperD the literture on rm exit in delining industry @wr of ttritionD eFgFD pudenerg et lFD IWVQD qhemwt nd xleuD IWVSA study how rms my exit mrket through time if too mny rms end up in the mrketF vondregn @IWWHA onsiders the se in whih two symmetri potentil rms n enterD exitD nd reEenter through the industry9s life yleF xrsimhn nd hng @PHHHA onsider the eet of strtegi rm entry to pitlize on potentil pioneering dvntges depending on heterogenous rm pilitiesD nd rgue why the mrket dominnt rm my e the lte entrntF V 6 See also Hopenhayn (1992) . 7 See also Cabral (1993) for a similar framework investigating the eect of experience advantages. Amir and Lambson (2003) investigate the dynamics of entry and exit under stochastic market conditions, considering equilibria where the last rms to enter are the rst rms to exit.
8 For analysis on the market eects of order of entry see, for example, Robinson et al. (1993) and Golder and yne potentil issue in some mrkets tht is not onsidered here is tht erly entrnts my engge in mrket tivities tht my dissude potentil future entrnts from entering the mrket @eFgFD fourguignon nd ethiD IWVID wilgrom nd oertsD IWVPD vlD IWWHAF sn this regrdD the entry deterrene literture @eFgFD peneD IWUUD hixitD IWUWA onsidered the possiility of rms investing in pity to deter potentil entrnts from oming into the mrketF sn reltion to this litertureD this pper looks t entry dynmis when demnd evolves over timeD nd rms re onsidered with n equl opportunity to enter the mrketF sn ddition the pper onsiders the se of mny rms nd the role of dierent forms of privte informtionF he pper onsiders the strtegi entry of rms s demnd develops exogenouslyD nd rgues tht rms eing forwrdElooking nd ompetition leds to rms oming into the mrket efore demnd tkeEoF sn some mrkets one my rgue tht entry of rms my itself led to inresed demndD tht isD the evolution of demnd is endogenous to rm entry @seeD for exmpleD egrwl nd fyusD PHHPD for rguments in this regrdAF W ith respet to this possiility this pper n e seen s showing tht we n oserve in the dt rm tkeEo efore demnd tkeEo independent of rm entry using demnd to developF xote lso tht if rm entry uses demnd to growD the results presented here will ontinue to holdF IH sn ftD if rm entry uses demnd to grow t deresing rteD rms my enter to exhust the returns to entryD nd the nlysis presented here n e seen s pprohing the se when severl rms re lredy in the mrket @suh tht we re lredy in the prt of the urve where more rms leds to lower prots per rmAF sf rm entry ets future demndD nother potentil issue is tht rms my freeEride on other rms entering rstD whih my provide inentives for rms to dely entryF his ould potentilly generte fore ginst rms entering efore demnd tkeEoF elso relted to this workD in some ses one n Tellis (1993) . 9 See also Economides (1996) . 10 Another possibility is that rms may want to enter early because of the lead time needed to develop some supply or demand side factors for demand. However, in many of the industries considered these factors do not seem crucial for the observed pattern of the take-o in the number of rms before the take-o of demand. S see rms eing more likely to enter mrket if rms with similr hrteristis re lredy there @heruyne nd eisteinD PHHSAF his ould e seen s rms with similr hrteristis entering the mrket t the sme timeD or s rm entering mrket providing informtion to potentil entrnts of the mrket protility @yfek nd urutD PHHVAF hese issuesD lthough importnt in some mrketsD re not onsidered in this pper so s to fous on the min point of the pper of strtegi entry under demnd evolutionF II he reminder of the pper is orgnized s followsF he next setion presents twoEperiodD twoEpotentilEentrnts model of the mrket intertionF etion Q extends this model to the se of more thn two periodsF he se of more thn two rms is explored in etion RD nd etion S onsiders the the se of potentil entrnt spei rm onditions eing privte informtionF etion T presents onluding remrks nd diretions for future reserhF 2. A Basic Model gonsider mrket with two periodsD where two potentil entrnts n deide to enter the mrket in eh of the periods y pying n entry ost F: sn eh periodD the deisions y the rms re simultneousD whih ptures the ide tht rm mkes deision without knowing yet if the ompetitor hs lredy deided to enterF hemnd is only relized in the seond periodD with the pyo per rm depending on the numer of rms in the mrketF his feture tries to pture the eet tht rms my hve the ility to enter the mrket prior to demnd growthF yne ould lso onsider the se where demnd is smll ut positive in the rst periodD ut this possiility does not et the min insights in this twoEpotentilEentrnts seF henote the pyo for rm in the seond period given tht n symmetri rms re in the mrket s @nA: e mke the nturl ssumption 11 The model considered here can also be seen as applying to an auction setting where bidders enter sequentially into an auction, and have an entry cost of entering the auction. See, for example, Moreno and Wooders (2009) for an auction model with entry costs.
T tht the prot per rm in the industry wekly dereses with the numer of ompetitorsD s more ompetitors my led to less demnd per rm nd more ompetitionF ht isD @nA is deresing in the numer of rms in the industryD n: por the twoErm se in this setionD we re just onerned with the prot of only one rm in the mrketD @IA; the prot of two rms in the mrketD @PA; nd we hve @IA > @PA: IP pirms disount future pyos with the disount ftor < I per periodF e onsider the se of suiently lose to one suh tht @IA > @PA: o mke the prolem interesting we onsider the se in whih @IA > F > @PA > H: his llows for the possiility tht single rm entering the mrket in the rst period n e protleD nd yields tht two rms entering in the seond period would led to oth rms eing unprotleF IQ e onentrte the nlysis on the symmetri equiliriF es threshold for omprisonD note tht if there is only one potentil entrntD it optimlly wits until the seond period to enter the mrketF o solve for the sugme perfet equilirium let us onsider rst the equilirium tions in the seond period given the stte of the mrket fter the rst periodF uppose no rm entered in the rst periodF henD in the seond period the symmetri equilirium would e in mixed strtegiesD s rm prefers to enter if the ompetitor does not enter the mrketD nd prefers to sty out if the ompetitor enters the mrketF henoting s p i the proility of entry in period i; the equilirium proility of entry for rm is determined y indierene etween entry nd stying outD p P @PA C @I p P A@IA F a H; whih yields p P a @IA F @IA @PA : he expeted prot in the seond period fter no entry in the rst period is zeroF xow onsider tht only one rm entered in the rst periodF henD the other rm will not wnt to enterD s F > @PA; nd the inument rm hs pyo of @IA; s the entry ost ws pid in 12 Due to more intense competition with a greater number of rms we might have the stronger eect that the total industry prot is decreasing with the number of rms. That is, n(n) n H (n H ) if n < n H : For the two-rm case in this section we would have (1) > 2(2): This stronger assumption is only used in Section 4 below.
13 If (1) > F > (1) no rm would ever enter in the rst period; if (1) < F no rm would ever enter the market; if (2) > F; both rms would always enter the market. For completeness, note also that if (1) < (2) then either rms enter the market in the second period or they never enter the market. U the rst periodF pinllyD if oth rms entered in the rst periodD eh rm gets prot of @PA: vet us now look t the rst periodF xote tht y the rgument ove if only one rm enters the mrket in the rst period then the other rm will sty out in the seond periodF henD if the ompetitor entered in the rst period rm would hve preferred to sty out s F > @PA; nd if the ompetitor does not enter in the rst period the rm would prefer to enter thenD s y witingD the rm erns n expeted prot of zeroD while y entering the mrket the rm gets @IA F > H: his represents the eet tht rm gins from oming in erly s it deters entry from the ompetitorF henD the equilirium in the rst period is gin in mixed strtegiesD where the pyo of stying out is zeroD s noted oveF he equilirium proility of entry for rm in the rst periodD p I ; is determined y indierene etween entry nd stying outD p I @PA C @I p I A@IA F a H; whih yields p I a @IA F @@IA @PAA :
his yields two interesting resultsF pirstD with strtegi entry nd forwrdElooking rmsD rms enter in the rst periodD in dvne of demnd reliztionD with positive proilityF his is euse y entering erlier rm n deter the entry of the ompetitorF xote tht without ompetition @just one potentil entrntA the rm only enters the mrket in the seond periodD nd there is no entry in the rst periodF xote lso tht with two myopi potentil entrnts there is no entry in the rst periodD nd in the seond period eh rm enters with the proility p P : his result illustrtes how the existene of ompeting forwrdElooking potentil entrnts my yield tht the tkeEo of the numer of rms ours prior to the tkeEo of demndD n empiril ft presented in egrwl nd fyus @PHHPAF IR eondD for the equilirium proilities of entryD one n immeditely otin thtD onditionl 14 Another potential factor of rms' early entry, not explored here, is that rms may not be sure which product characteristics are the preferred ones, and may enter early to learn to get their product right. This could potentially lead to the existence of early entry followed by an industry shake-out of the more inecient product designs. V on no prior entryD rms re more likely to enter when demnd is present thn prior to demnd eing relizedD p I < p P : his results from disounting of the entry pyos if rm enters in the rst periodD while the entry osts re pid in the period of entryF feuse of the importne of these two results we stte them in the following propositionF Proposition 1: Consider a two-period, two-potential-entrants' market. In such a market rms enter prior to the demand realization with positive probability, and, conditional on no entry, each rm enters with greater probability in the period in which demand is realized than prior to demand realization.
gomputing the expeted numer of rms in the mrket in the seond period one otins Pp I C Pp P @I p I A P : gompring it with the se in whih rms re myopi one otins tht if the disount ftor is suiently lose to oneD then the expeted numer of rms is lrger with forwrdElooking rmsF es is lose to one the equilirium strtegies in the rst period re lose to those in the seond period ndD thereforeD with two periods for rms to enterD the expeted numer of rms in the seond period is lrger thn if rms hoose to enter only in the seond periodD s is the se when rms re myopiF xoteD howeverD tht if p P is lose to oneD iFeFD rms enter lmost for sure in the seond periodD then if is suiently less thn oneD we hve smller expeted numer of rms when rms re forwrdElooking thn when rms re myopiD s with myopi rms we lmost lwys hve two rms in the mrket while with forwrdElooking rmsD with proility Pp I @I p I A; only one rm enters the mrketF xow onsider the omprison of the eet of one versus two potentil entrnts on the expeted numer of rms in the mrket in the seond periodF ith only one potentil entrntD tht rm will lwys enter the mrket in the seond periodD nd the numer of rms in the mrket in the seond period is lwys oneF ith two potentil entrntsD eh rm n enter the mrket in eh period with some proilityD nd the expeted numer of rms in the mrket in the seond period W n e greter thn or less thn oneF sn this omprison one n show tht if the entry osts re lowD the expeted numer of rms in the seond period is greter with two potentil entrnts thn with oneD nd tht the threshold of entry osts for this greter numer of rms is higher when rms re forwrdElookingF his is euse the ost of entry is onsidered lowD nd with multiple opportunities to enter the mrket @the forwrdElooking seA more rms my end up in the mrketF e note these results on the numer of rms in the following propositionF Proposition 2: Consider a two-period, two-potential-entrants' market. Then, if the discount factor is suciently close to one, the expected number of rms in the market in the second period is greater when rms are forward-looking than when rms are myopic. If entry costs are low the expected number of rms in the market is greater with two potential entrants than with one potential entrant, and the entry costs threshold for this to occur is greater when rms are forward-looking than when rms are myopic.
he nlysis ove onsidered the se of two symmetri rmsF etion S elow onsiders the se where rms my hve dierent entry ostsF sf the prot per rm is lso dierent ross rmsD similr results would follow if rms re not too dierentD with the rm with higher expeted prot more likely to enter in eh periodF 3. Large Number of Periods gonsider now the se with lrge numer of periods nd two potentil entrntsF uppose tht strting in period zero two potentil entrnts deide if nd when to enter the mrket in eh of n innite numer of periodsF IS hemnd is zero until period nd positive t onstnt level 15 Entry is dened here as the observable commitment of a rm to enter the market and sinking entry costs. Given delay in coming to market, in several industries entry can potentially occur before a rm actually starts selling in a market.
IH from period onwrdsF IT henoting y @nA the prot per period fter period if n rms re in the mrketD the present vlue of prots from period t > onwrdsD if the mrket hs n rms from period t onwrdsD is @nA I : sn order to mke the prolem interesting we ssume tht the entry osts F re suh tht @PA I < F < @IA I ; so tht exEnteD it is dvntgeous to e the only rm in the mrketD nd disdvntgeous to e one of two rms in the mrketF ht isD if there is lredy nother rm in the mrketD rm lwys hooses not to enterF hene y CI @IA I < F < @IA I : henD is the rst period when it is protle for rm to enter the mrketF xote tht for ny ; if is high enough we hve a H:
prom the nlysis ove we n then otin the proility of entry p t t period t given tht the other rm hs not entered s
xote tht this proility is inresing over time s the loser we re to when demnd inreses the more protle it is for rms to enter the mrketF xote tht if demnd were expeted to derese t some point in the futureD the proility of entry given no entry y the other rm would derese fter period : xote lso tht the proility p t is inresing t deresing rte for t < ; s the inrese in the enet of entry is smller the loser the rms re to the period in whih demnd inresesF pigure I illustrtes the evolution of p t for a PH; a :WU; F a PH; nd @nA a I=n: por this seD a R:
xote tht the proility of entry for t < is inresing in the disount ftor : his is euse higher disount ftor inreses the present vlue of prots when demnd inresesD oth for the pigure I shows the evolution of the expeted numer of rms for set of prmeter vluesF xote tht the expeted numer of rms in the mrket inreses over timeD s rms hve hd more opportunities to enter the mrketF he inrese in the expeted numer of rms in period t is given y Pp t ¥ t I iaH @I p i A P > H: xote tht fter some period this inrese eomes smller nd smller s the term ¥ t I iaH @I p i A P dereses in t: xote tht for t > ut smll we n hve tht the inreses in the expeted numer of rms is inresing in t s the term p t inreses in t; whih my overome the dereses resulting from ¥ t I iaH @I p i A P : gompred with the oneErm seD note tht prior to the expeted numer of rms in the mrket is greter thn zeroD while it is zero in the oneErm seF ht isD ompetition leds to more rms entering the mrket prior to : xote lso tht with proility one t lest one rm enters the mrket when there re two potentil entrntsD nd with positive proility two rms enter the mrketF henD the expeted numer of rms tht ever is in the mrket is stritly greter thn one rmF por lose to one @with F hnging suh tht @PA < F @I A < @IAA we hve p t lose to @IA F @I A @IA @PA for ll t: e n then otin tht the expeted numer of rms in the mrket t period is lose to Pp I @I p A 2 I @I p A 2 whih is greter thn one if > I P log@p=PA log@I p A : por this seD the expeted numer of rms tht is ever in the mrket n e otined to e lose to P P p > I: he proility of two rms ending up in the mrket n e otined to e lose to then there re no vlues for the entry osts F suh tht rms enter when they re myopiF sn other wordsD if rms re myopi they re less likely to enter s they do not fully vlue the future potentil protsF enother interesting question is wht hppens when the time etween periods is reduedF yne n show tht when the time etween periods goes to zero only one rm enters the mrket t time ; s there re then mny opportunities to enter lose to D nd the proility of entry there is lose to zeroD mking it unlikely tht oth rms will enter the mrket t the sme timeF he eppendix provides further disussion on this seF he results ove onsider the existene of mixed strtegies with more thn one rm potentilly entering in eh period @ rm mking the deision of whether to enter without knowing whether ompetitors re lso entering the mrketAF es noted oveD the limiting se of the time etween periods onverging to zero ddresses this issue of mixed strtegies s the equilirium hs only one rm entering the mrketF enother wy to ddress this issue is to inlude some degree of privte informtion y rmsD s disussed in etion S elowD suh tht strtegy y eh rm is pure strtegy to enter or not to enter the mrket depending on its privte informtionF pinllyD still nother possiility is to onsider sitution in whih in eh period only one rm n mke the deision whether or not to enter the mrketF uppose for exmple tht one rm n only enter in the odd periodsD nd the other rm n only enter in the even periodsF hen one n otin tht if we re in the period immeditely efore nd no rm hs entered the mrketD then the rm tht n enter in tht period enters the mrketF fut then the rm tht hs the opportunity to enter the mrket two periods efore would hoose to do soF fy itertion one n otin tht in this sitution the rm tht hs hne to enter the mrket t period hooses to do soF he equilirium hs then only one rm in the mrket tht enters t period ; IQ efore the sles tkeEoD whih is extly the sme outome s when the time etween periods onverges to zeroF 4. Large Number of Firms 4.1. Introduction gonsider now the se twoEperiod model presented ove ut suppose tht there re severl poE tentil entrntsD nd tht the mrket my ultimtely hve in equilirium more thn one rmF e denote s N the numer of potentil entrntsD nd s n the numer of rms tht hve entered the mrketF purthermoreD let n I e the numer of entrnts in the rst period nd n P e the numer of entrnts in the seond periodF e ssume N nd n to e lrgeD with N muh greter thn n in equiliriumF henote @nA s the prot per rm in the seond period if there re n rms in the mrketF e ssume n@nA deresing in n; the industry prots go down with the numer of rmsF purthermoreD we ssume tht @nA is onvexD tht isD the derese in prots when inresing n is greter for smll numer of rms thn for lrge numer of rmsF foth of these ssumptions hold for the se of prie ompetition or gournot ompetition under some generl ssumptionsF he ltter mensD for exmpleD tht the prot per rm goes down more when the industry expnds from two to three rms in the mrketD thn from three to four rmsF IU sn order to get shrper results we ssume @nA a e n ; with ! I for n@nA to e deresing in n for ll n > I: sn the rst period the prot per rm is @nA if there re n rms in the mrketD with @I AF e < < I: here is lwys suh n if F is smll enough suh tht severl rms would like to e in the mrketF e think lso of lose to oneD suh tht n e lose to zeroF he inequlity > @I AF e is not present in the previous setionD nd is neessry here euse now one single rm entering the mrket is not pivotl in deterring entry in the seond period @this inequlity is disussed in greter detil in etion RFQ elowAF sf a H then no rm would enter in the rst period @ontrry to wht hppens in the previous setionAF gonsidering smll ut positive leds to severl rms entering the mrket in the rst periodD prior to steep demnd growthF he inequlity < I ptures the eet tht demnd grows from the rst to the seond periodF IV sn symmetri equilirium in given period eh rm will enter with some proility p: qiven tht N rms independently follow this strtegyD the tul numer of rms tht enter the industry is rndom vrileF ith N lrge the proility distriution of the numer of rms tht enter the mrket n e pproximted y norml distriution with men pN nd vrine p@I pAN; whih we will use in wht followsF vet g@xY ; P A nd G@xY ; P A eD respetivelyD the density nd umultive distriution funtion of normlly distriuted rndom vrile x with men nd vrine P : pinllyD dene m s the numer of rms suh tht the prot per rm in the seond period is equl to the xed ost of entryD @mA a F: 4.2. Second Period gonsider the equilirium strtegies in the seond period of the mrket ssuming tht n I rms entered in the rst periodF sf n I C I ! m; no rm will enter the mrket in the seond periodD nd even if it were only one rm entering the mrketD the prot otinedD @n I C IAD would e less thn the xed ost of entry F: uppose now tht n I C I < m: hen the proility of entry in the mrket should e suh tht the expeted prot of entering is equl to the expeted prot of stying outD zeroF he proility 18 If > 1 then demand is decreasing through time and there are even greater incentives of rms entering in the rst period. @SA prom this one n otin diretly tht the proility of entry is deresing in the numer of potentil entrnts N; the numer of inumentsD n I D nd in the entry osts F: IW e greter numer of potentil entrnts mkes eh rm e more onservtive with its proility of entryD for fer of too mny rms entering the mrketF roweverD one n otin tht the expeted numer of rms in the mrket n I C p P @N n I A is inresing in the numer of potentil entrntsD N: e greter numer of inumentsD n I ; or greter entry ost F; mkes the mrket less ttrtive to entryD nd the proility of entry is lowerF snterestinglyD note tht the expeted numer of rms in the mrketD n I C p P @N n I AD is greter thn the numer of rms m whose entry would led to prot per rm equl to the entry ostF ht isD with proility greter thn I=P; there re too mny rms in the mrketF he intuition for this result follows from the onvexity of the prot funtion @nAF ith onvex prot funtionD rms like unertintyD nd re more likely to enterD entied y the possiility of the mrket hving 19 Note that F < 1; and log F < 0 for some number of rms to want to enter the market.
IS
IT very few rms nd generting high prots per rmF PH o illustrte these eets onsider the following exmple with a :I; a I:I; N a IHHH; F a :HHHHI; nd a :WS: prom this one n otin m a IH:RU so tht if IH or more rms enter in the rst periodD no rm enters in the seond periodF pigure P shows the expeted numer of rms entering in the seond period s funtion of the numer of rms tht entered in the rst periodF pigure P lso illustrtes how the expeted numer of rms in the mrket t the end of the seond period is greter thn the numer of rms m whose entry would led to prot per rm equl to the entry ostF por exmpleD if R rms entered in the rst periodD the expeted numer of rms tht would enter in the seond period would e round IS; with n expeted numer of rms in the mrket in the seond period of round IW; greter thn m a IH:RU: he proility of ending up in the seond period with more thn m rms in the mrket given tht R rms entered in the rst period is slightly greter thn WV7: 4.3. First Period gonsider now the deisions y the rms in the rst periodF sn symmetri equiliriumD rms will enter with some proility p I in the rst periodF sf the tul numer of rms tht enter the mrket in the rst period is greter thn m we hve from ove tht no other rm will enter in the seond periodF sf the tul numer of rms tht enter the mrket in the rst period is less thn m then rms enter in the seond period with proility of entry p P @n I A whih is determined y @SAF wking the expeted present vlue of prots equl to the entry osts F one otins where the seond term is the expeted prot in the rst periodD the third term is the prt of the seond period expeted prot when few rms enter in the rst periodD suh tht there is more entry in the seond periodD nd the fourth term is the prt of the seond period expeted prot when too mny rms enter in the rst periodD suh tht there is no more entry in the seond periodF sing @SA nd g@A eing norml density one n then otin the equilirium ondition for p I s his expression yields severl oservtionsF pirstD note tht if a H @s in etion PA then no rm would enter in the rst periodF o see this note tht the left hnd side is negtive when evluted t a H nd p I a H: ht isD if no rm entersD the expeted prot of rm entering the mrket would e negtiveD nd this would e even more negtive if more rms enteredF xow onsider wht hs to e ondition on suh tht t lest one rm would like to enter the mrket in the rst periodF sn tht seD if tht rm is the only rm entering the mrketD its expeted pyo @the left hnd side of @UA with ertinty of only one rm entering in the rst periodA would e F C e C F: wking this expression stritly greter thn zero leds to the ondition > @I AF e noted oveF o gin intuition on this result note tht in the seond period the expeted prot of rm entering in the rst period is elow or equl to F: prom the rst period perspetiveD this is disounted to e worth t most F: por rm entering in the rst periodD nd if a H; tht rm would getD t mostD F minus the entry osts F; whih is stritly negtiveF sf a H it is then etter not to enter in the rst periodF IV eondD s in the seond period nlysisD given the onvexity of the prot funtion there is fore for more rms to enter in the rst period thn the numer of rms tht would led to zero exEnte protsF o fous on this eet note tht the numer of rms entering in the rst period whih would led to zero exEnte protsD m H ; is dened y @m H A a e m H a F £ P ; where £ P is the expeted seondEperiod protD whih n potentilly e funtion of m H : PI henD if the expeted numer of rms entering in the rst period is m H ; tht isD p I N a m H ; nd the expeted seondEperiod prots remined unhngedD then the expeted disounted prots for rm entering in the rst period would e e m H e 2 m H @I p 1 A=P F C £ P whih is stritly positive s e 2 m H @I p 1 A=m H > I: ht isD for eqution @UA to e stisedD the expeted numer of rms entering the mrket hs to e greter thn m H : sn the exmple ove one n ompute m H a IH:SI nd p I a :HPP; whih leds to n expeted numer of rms entering in the rst period of round PQ rmsD greter thn m H :
hirdD if the disount ftor is lose to oneD we hve tht the numer of rms tht enter in the rst period tht would led to zero exEnte prots is greter thn the numer of rms tht would led to zero exEnte prots for rms entering in the seond periodF his is euse rms tht enter in the rst period lso enet from the rstEperiod protsF sf ll the rms entered in the rst periodD the numer of rms tht would led to zero disounted prots for lose to one would e determined y @m H A C @m H A a F; whih mens tht m H is greter thn the numer of rms tht would led to zero exEnte prots for rms entering in the seond periodD m; whihD s noted oveD ws dened y @mA a F: his is fore for the numer of rms to inrese prior to demnd inresingF sn the exmple ove this holds s m H a IH:SI > m a IH:RU: yne n lso otin tht the proility of entry in the rst period suh tht there is no entry in the seond period is greter thn WW7; lmost ll entry is in the rst periodF pourthD s the numer of potentil entrnts N inresesD following up on the nlysis of the 21 Note that for low, we have the expected second-period prot, £ 2 ; equal to F; as rms enter in the second period such that the expected prots are equal to the entry costs.
IW seond periodD there is fore for the expeted numer of rms in the mrket to inreseF o see this onsider the eet of the numer of potentil rms N on the expression e p 1 NC 2 2 p 1 @I p 1 AN in @UAF sf N inreses nd p I N remined onstntD this expression would inrese @greter vrine of the numer of rms in the mrketAD whih mens tht for @UA to holdD we would need more rms to enter the mrketD tht isD greter p I ; leding to greter p I N: pifthD nd interestinglyD with lrge numer of rmsD the possiility of lter entry in the seond period is fore towrds less entry in the rst periodF o see thisD note tht if too few rms enter in the rst periodD then they know tht rms will ome in the seond period suh tht the expeted seond period prots is F: yn the other hndD if too mny rms enter in the rst periodD then potentil entrnts in the seond period sty outF ht isD rst period entrnts will hve limit on how muh they n gin if the entry unertinty results in too few rmsD ut hve no limit on their losses if the entry unertinty results in too mny rmsF o gin further intuitionD suppose tht rms ould only enter in the mrket in the rst periodF henD the equilirium ondition would e F C e p 1 NC 2 2 p 1 @I p 1 AN f C g a H insted of @UAF sn this se the expeted seond period prots would e e p 1 NC 2 2 p 1 @I p 1 AN a R N H e n 1 g@n I Y p I N; p I @I p I ANA dn I while in the se in whih rms n enter in the seond period the expeted seond period prots would e the lower mount R m H R e @n 1 Cn 2 A g@n P Y p P @n I A@N n I A; p P @n I A@I p P @n I AA@N n I AA dn P g@n I Y p I N; p I @I p I ANA dn I C R N m e n 1 g@n I Y p I N; p I @I p I ANA dn I : hereforeD if rms were not llowed to enter in the seond periodD more rms would tully enter in the rst periodF xote tht in the ontext of the model ll rms tht enter in the rst period deide to sty on in the seond period independent of the numer of rms tht entered in the rst periodD s @nA > H for ny n: ht isD in the ontext of the modelD whether or not rms hve the option to exit in the seond period does not et the result tht the possiility of entry in the seond period limits entry in the rst periodF sn vrition of the model where @nA n e negtive for suiently lrge n; then if too mny rms entered in the rst periodD some would exit in the seond periodF sn PH this seD the eet tht the possiility of entry in the seond period limits entry in the rst period would still e present @s rms py sunk entry ost in the rst periodA ut would e diminishedF PP xote lso tht if the mrket hs not mny rms @integer prolemsAD then the eets of the previous setions strt oming into ply with entering rms knowing tht y eing in the mrket they will deter entry y the ompetitorsD nd hve positive protsF 5. Private Information, Pure Strategies, and Firm Capabilities 5.1. Private Information Independent Through Time he nlysis ove onsidered the se in whih rms were symmetri nd there ws no privte informtionD with the equilirium eing in mixed strtegies in every periodF e now onsider the existene of privte informtion y eh potentil entrntD nd disuss how this possiility leds to pure strtegy equiliriD s noted y rrsnyi @IWUQA for the stti seF rere we onsider the se when the privte informtion of eh rm is only relevnt in the period under onsidertionF sn the next susetion we llow the privte informtion to hve eet throughout the lifetime of the potentil entrntF sn the model of the etion Q onsider now tht in eh period t eh potentil entrnt i drws xed ost F it from uniform distriution with support F; F ; with @PA I < F < F < @IA I ; nd with F it eing independent ross i nd t: PQ henD denoting s V @tA the expeted net present vlue of pyos for rm if no rm hs entered the mrket t the eginning of period t; efore the reliztion of F it ; we hve tht the threshold 22 Another possibility not considered here is that rms in a market may decide to merge, which could lead to further eects on the dynamics of entry. See, for example, Gowrisankaran (1999) for a model investigating these eects with numerical simulations.
23 Alternatively, the private information of the rms could be a signal of the market demand level. This possibility is discussed in the Conclusion section. @IHA his representtion genertes severl points of dierene with respet to the nlysis oveF xow rms hve stritly positive expeted pyoD in omprison to zeroF his is euse rms n drw lower xed ost of entry whih is smller thn the threshold xed ost of entry whih yields entry eing optimlF purthermoreD now rms n hoose to wit euse of the option vlue of drwing low xed ost of entry in future periodsF his option vlue is inluded in V @tA; the expeted net present vlue of prots t the strt of period t if oth rms hve not yet enteredD nd efore the entry ost is oservedF sn order to proeed onsider 3 hen the disount ftor onverges to oneD nd entry osts re drwn independently over timeD rms ount the future s muh s the presentD nd t eh moment in time where no entry hs ourred the mrket onditions re the smeD whether or not demnd is relizedF e otin then tht the proility of entry onverges to eing onstnt through timeD whether the rms re or re not in period in whih demnd hs strtedF es expetedD the greter the prots tht rms n ernD whtever the mrket strutureD the more likely rms re to enter the mrketF elso s expetedD s the verge entry ost inreses the less likely rms re to enter the mrketD s they try to void entering t the sme time s the ompetitorF wore interestinglyD the greter the spred of possile entry osts @vrine of entry ostsAD the less likely rms re to enter the mrketD nd the more likely they re to wit for future periodF he intuition is tht the greter the vrine of entry osts the more it pys o to wit for the PQ option vlue of drwing very low entry ost in the next periodF xote lso tht this implies tht the proility of entry is lower in this se thn when there is no privte informtion of entry ostsF yne n lso otin tht the proility of entry is greter thn the se of no privte informtion nd entry osts equl to e F =@I A; nd lower thn the se of no privte informtion nd entry osts equl to e F =@I A: sn terms of expeted present vlue of protsD s expetedD we n otin tht it is inresing in the prots tht rms n otin with either one or two rms in the mrketD nd deresing in the verge entry ostF eginD more interestinglyD the expeted present vlue of prots is inresing in the vrine of possile entry ostsF he reson is thtD with greter vrine of entry ostsD rms tend to wit for the option of low vlue of entry ostsD nd only then enter the mrketF yne n lso ompute the expeted osts of entry onditionl on rms entering the mrketF hese n otined to e equl to e F C p e F e F P : yne n then otin tht the expeted osts of entry onditionl on rms entering the mrket re inresing in the rms9 protsD @IA nd @PA; inresing in the verge unonditionl entry ostD e F C e F P ; nd deresing in the spred of possile verge per period entry ostsD e F e F ; s expetedD given the rguments oveF gompred with monopoly @only one potentil entrntAD note tht ompetition leds gin to positive proility of rms entering the mrket efore demnd is relizedD nd tht this is more likely to our the greter the disount ftor nd the greter the numer of periods in whih entry is possile nd demnd is still not in pleF xote lso tht with ompetition there is positive proility of two rms eing in the mrketD whih does not hppen under monopolyF xote tht from soil welfre point of view rms my enter too fst in equiliriumF his ould e the se if the enets in terms of onsumer surplus of ompetition re not too lrgeF sn ompetitionD seond rm onsidering entering ompres P with the entry ostsD while in terms of PR soil welfre the omprison is of P P I with the entry osts @nd note tht P > P P I AF xote lso tht if the soil welfre optimum is for just one rm to enter the mrketD nd if regultor n set threshold entry ost for entryD then it my e optiml for the regultor to set lower threshold entry ost thn the equilirium one onsidered oveD so tht the likelihood of too mny rms entering the mrket is lowerF e regultor ould hnge the rms9 entry ostsD for exmpleD y eting the ost of lienses to enter mrket @eFgFD lienses in moile teleommunitions mrketsAF 5.2. Private Information Fixed Through Time gonsider now the se in whih rms drw independently n entry ost tht is xed throughout the lifetime of the mrketF ht isD the drwn entry ost ould e seen s the rm pility for tht mrketF roweverD rm might not know the entry ost drwn y the ompetitorD the rm pility of the ompetitorF futD the deision of rm not to enter provides some informtion to the ompetitor out the rm9s entry ostF he equilirium involves then rms witing to enter in ertin period if the other rm hs not entered previouslyF sn eh period t there will then e threshold b F t of the lst rm9s type entering in tht periodF pirms with F P @ b @ITA prom thisD given tht the threshold e F t inreses in t; we hve tht the proility of entry p t hnges through timeD ontrrily to the se in whih the entry osts re drwn independently over timeF purthermoreD s stted in the next propositionD one n show tht the proility of entry is deresing through timeF Proposition 4: Suppose 3 I; and that the entry costs drawn by each rm are xed through time.
Then, the probability of entry of each rm, conditional on no prior entry, is decreasing through time.
he proof is presented in the eppendixF sn equiliriumD rms n never enter with proility zero or oneD whih mens tht e F t is stritly inresing in t without ever rehing e F : his mens thtD t lest t some pointD e F t inreses t deresing rteD whih then implies tht the proility of entry is deresing through timeF es oveD note tht with severl potentil entrntsD rms ome into the mrket efore demnd is relized with positive proilityF xote lso tht if one lirtes the support of entry osts suh tht the verge entry proility onditionl on no prior entry is the sme with independent drws s with xed pilitiesD entry ours fster under xed pilitiesF xote lso tht ll types of rms hve to hve hne of entering the mrketD euse otherwise the proility of entry would eome t some point so low tht it would py o for rm with PT high entry ost to enter the mrketF his mens tht e F t onverges to e F when t goes to innityF et the limit one n otin the proility of entry s @IA e F @IA @PA ; whih is the proility of entry in the se without privte informtion nd entry osts e F =@I A: qiven tht the proility of entry is deresing in t; p t+1 pt < I; we hveD from @ITAD tht p t < @IA e Ft @IA @PA : ht isD for eh threshold e F t the proility of entry with privte informtion nd xed pilities is lower thn the proility of entry without privte informtion t tht entry ostF qiven tht the rms with entry osts suh tht they enter in period t hve lower entry osts thn e F t then the proility of entry in period t is lso lower thn if there ws no privte informtion t ny entry ost of the rms tht enter in period t under privte informtion nd xed pilitiesF his lso then implies tht if there is no privte informtion with xed pilities t the verge entry ostsD the proility of entry is greter thn with privte informtion nd xed pilitiesF ith privte informtionD rms re strtegi in delying entry s there is n expeted positive pyo of delying entryF gompring the se of entry osts independently drwn over time with the se of xed pilE itiesD one n otin tht fter some time with no entryD the proility of entry when entry osts re independently drwn through time is greter thn in the se of xed pilitiesF 6. Conclusion his pper onsiders strtegi entry in mrket where rms my e le to enter the mrket prior to demnd growthF e show tht ompetition leds to entry prior to demnd growthD s presented in empiril studiesD nd disuss how the proility of entry inreses through time prior to demnd reliztionF por the se of potentilly mny rms in the mrketD the pper shows two dditionl importnt eetsF pirstD given the onvexity of the prot funtionD rms like unertintyD nd the expeted PU numer of rms is greter thn the one tht would led to zero exEnte protsF eondD forwrdE looking rms understnd tht if too few rms enter in the eginning of the mrketD other rms will ome into the mrket lter to orret ny potentil rentsD nd this redues the enet of entering the mrket erlyF he pper lso shows tht with privte informtion one my replite the omplete informtion mixed strtegy equiliri with pure strtegiesD ut tht there re dditionl importnt eetsF rivte informtion n e onsidered s either independent drws of entry osts through timeD or s xed drws t the eginning of the mrketF sn oth sesD the expeted prots re greter thn in models of omplete informtionF sn the independent drws seD the greter expeted prots result from the option vlue of witing for lower drw of entry ostsF sn the xed drws se the greter expeted prots result from the potentil to strtegi dely in entering y rms tht do not hve very low entry ostF he pper onsiders privte informtion y rms on their entry ostsF elterntivelyD one ould onsider tht rms reeive privte signl on the demnd onditionsF his possiility ould e importnt in severl mrketsD nd it would e interesting to investigteF he nlysis in suh se would e similr to the one onsidered here with the dierene tht positive signl would likely men tht the ompetitor lso reeived positive signlD nd thereforeD the news of positive signl would hve to e tempered y the inresed likelihood of entry y ompetitorsF enother issue tht ould e potentilly interesting to investigte in future reserh is tht in severl mrket situtions entry osts re invested grdully rther thn the disrete entry deision tht is onsidered hereF 
